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Neumeyer: The Right of Publicity and its Descendibility

THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND ITS
DESCENDIBILITY
VICKY GERL NEUMEYER*
I.

"The right of publicity.

INTRODUCTION
. .

represents the right of an individ-

ual to control the commercial value of his name and likeness and
to prevent their unauthorized exploitation by others."' The purpose behind the right of publicity is similar to that underlying
many of the tenets of a democratic society.2 It has been described
as the "encouragement of individual enterprise and creativity by
allowing people to profit from their own efforts." 3
Most courts and many state legislatures recognize the right of
publicity." However, the trend toward recognizing its
descendibility is not unanimously accepted. 5 Even those accepting
its descendibility disagree over the theoretical basis supporting the
doctrine of descendibility. Similarly, tension exists between the
first amendment freedom of speech and a descendible right of publicity.' This Article addresses the origin of the right of publicity
and the theoretical and legal bases concerning descendibility, 7 cur* Ms. Neumeyer is a 1989 graduate of Loyola University School of Law in New Orleans.
She completed a judicial clerkship with the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and is currently
working in the litigation department of Exxon Company, U.S.A.
1. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
2. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573, 576-77
(1976), where the Court finds the rationale for the right of publicity analogous to those
underlying copyright and patent law.
3. Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death? 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128 (1980) [hereinafter Felcher & Rubin].
4. Dewey, The Evolving Doctrineof Right of Publicity: JudicialProtection of Celebrity's PecuniaryInterestfrom Commercial Exploitation of His or Her Identity and Theatrical Style, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 39, 46, 62 (1988).
5. Terrell & Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and
Economic Analysis of the InheritabilityIssue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Terrell
& Smith].
6. Specifically, the concern is with the possibility of an unlimited right of publicity.
Some fear that historical and biographical analysis, as well as public comment, could be
threatened. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 708-09 (1982) (Weltner, J., concurring). This concern is
further endangered by the possibility of a right of publicity that is unlimited in duration.
See Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
7. See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
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rent legislation and associated problems,' and proposed solutions.9
II.

ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The term "right of publicity" was introduced in HaelanLaboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.. 1O It emerged from the
right of privacy,"1 that is, the appropriation of one's name or likeness for another's advantage."2 The right of privacy was historically
viewed as a personal right terminating at death. By analogy, the
right of publicity should also terminate at death.13 However, the
Haelan court rejected this analogy, explaining that prominent persons have an economic interest in the publicity value of their
images that is separate and independent of the right of privacy."
The court did not address the issue of descendibility, as it was not
faced with that question.
Philosopher John Locke suggested that an analogy to property
rights would be more appropriate.15 Under Locke's theory, property rights existed before the state, which later developed to protect individuals' rights "to the fruits of their labor."'" Accordingly,
as property rights were inheritable, the right of publicity can also
17
be descendible.
The debate is one of personal right versus property right. Is
the right of publicity a personal right that is not devisable upon
death? Or is the right of publicity a property right that is devisable? Neither is a perfect classification. Publicity rights are suscep8. See infra notes 146-179 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 180-220 and accompanying text.
10. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
11. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1127. See Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v.
Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen,

513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981). See also R.F.
HUmAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 134 (1987).

HXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SocIry:

12. Terrell & Smith, supra note 5, at 11. The right of privacy comprises four distinct
causes of action: (1) "the appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantages, of.the
plaintiff's name or likeness;" (2) "intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion;" (3) disclosing "private information about the plaintiff, even though it is true and no
action would lie for defamation;" and (4) casting "the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye." W.L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971). See also W.L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 635 (2d ed. 1955).
13. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1127.
14. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. See also Note, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1703, 1705
(1983).
15. See Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & COMRP. PROBS. 203 (1954) (cited
in Note, supra note 14, at 1705).
16. Note, supra note 14, at 1706 n.20.
17. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3,.at 1127.
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tible of pecuniary value which is unique to a property right." Yet,
falling within the property classification does not automatically
lead to descendibility.1 '
A common thread in the search for a theoretical basis for the
publicity right is the idea that individuals have the right to control
the fruits of their efforts and enterprise. Third parties should not
be allowed to appropriate the work of another for his or her own
profit and advantage.20
III.

CASE LAW

The theoretical debate regarding the descendibility of the
right of publicity has produced a body of case law described as a
"legal wilderness."2 Historically, the legal descendibility issue involved many well-known persons. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures
Co.,22 the California Superior Court held that Bela Lugosi's identity as Dracula was a property right and, as such, descended to his
heirs.2" In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,2 " the New York district court faced the issue of infringement of the publicity rights of
Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy. 5 The court explored the differences
between a personal right and a property right,2" and concluded
that the widows of the comedy team had a cause of action because
18.

Terrell & Smith, supra note 5, at 11.

19. J.T. MCCARTHY, THs RIGHTS OF

PUBLicrY AND PRIVACY

§ 9:7 (1988).

20. See, e.g., Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Esq. 136, 67 A. 392, 395
(N.J. Ch. 1907) (extending the term "property rights" to include the use of one's name and
pictorial representation); Hart, The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History, in 48 JOHN LOCKE 262 (1978) (discussing a 1689 writing by Locke which set forth
Locke's belief in a natural right to private property). See generally Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798) (discussing the natural rights of the individual).
21. Note, supra note 14, at 1703.
22. 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ca. 1979).
23. Lugosi, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 551.
24. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
25. Id. at 838.
26. The Price court commented:
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy ... is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a logical conclusion to any such claim. In addition,
based upon the same theoretical foundation, such a right of privacy is not assignable during life. When determining the scope of the right of publicity, however, one must take into account the purely commercial nature of the protected
right. Courts and commentators have done just that in recognizing the right of
publicity as assignable. There appears to be no logical reason to terminate this
right upon death of the person protected. It is for this, presumably, that this
publicity right has been deemed a 'property right.'
Id. at 844 (footnotes omitted).
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the right of publicity descended to them. 7
Three years later, in Hicks v. CasablancaRecords, the same
district court defined what is known as the lifetime exploitation
requirement:
[A] party claiming the right [of publicity] must establish that
the decedent acted in such a way as to evidence his or her own
recognition of the extrinsic commercial value of his or her name
or likeness, and manifested that recognition in some overt man-

ner, e.g. making an inter vivos transfer of the rights in the name
[], or posing for bubble gum cards.. ..
In Hicks, which involved the publicity rights of Agatha Christie,
the court concluded that the author had exploited her right of
publicity during her lifetime, and because of this, the right was
descendible30
The lifetime exploitation requirement is viewed as a limiting
principle meant to "physicalize" the intangible right of publicity,"
as an interest manifested in a discernible form is more easily legitimized as a survivable property right.32 While the Hicks court acknowledged the lifetime exploitation requirement, it rejected the
defendants' argument for an extension of the theory. The defendants had maintained that the exploitation must involve conduct or
property not associated with the primary profession of the decedent."3 The court concluded all that was necessary was some recog34
nition of the publicity right by the author during her lifetime.
In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc, 5 decided three years
before Hicks, the New York district court had raised a variation of
27. Id. at 846.
28. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
29. Id. at 429.
30. Id. at 429-30.
31. Note, supra note 14, at 1707-14.
32. Id. at 1712. See also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1131.
33. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429 n.6.
34. Id. at 429. One commentator criticized this decision, claiming that the court misinterpreted a footnote in an earlier decision rendered by the Second Circuit in Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at §9. In
Factors, which involved Elvis Presley's estate, the court stated that it did not have to decide
if the descendibility of publicity rights was contingent on lifetime exploitation, because
Presley had exploited his right of publicity. Factors, 579 F.2d at 222 n.11. The Hicks court
followed the Second Circuit's reasoning, explaining that that court had held that the right of
publicity "survive[d] only if it [was] found that the owner 'exploited' the right during his or
her lifetime." Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429. See infra notes 68-94 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Factors case.
35. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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the lifetime exploitation requirement.3 6 In that case, defendants
argued that Laurel and Hardy abandoned their publicity rights by
not using them prior to their deaths.3 7 The court found this assertion to be nonsensical, and rejected the notion that decedents had
to have asserted their publicity rights during their lifetime for
them to descend to their heirs.38 Therefore, it is clear that the
court changed its position between 1975 and 1978.
In 1979, the Supreme Court of California reversed the 1972
Lugosi decision. 39 The court explained: "It seems to us rather
novel to urge that because one's immediate ancestor did not exploit the flood of publicity and/or other evidence of public acceptance he received in his lifetime for commercial purposes, the opportunity to have done so is property which descends to his
heirs.140 This decision has been criticized as "opaque" and "thoroughly confus[ing] the rights of publicity, privacy, and the law of
trademarks, mixing them up into an unpalatable souffl6 of
'41
confusion."
The lifetime exploitation doctrine provides the link between
the right of publicity and the notion of unlawful appropriation of a
property right. The application varies from court to court, and is
made even more confusing by choice of law principles. In 1982, in
Groucho Marx Productions v. Day and Night Co.,42 the Second
Circuit reversed a district court decision involving the publicity
rights of the Marx Brothers. 48 The district court, applying New
York law, concluded that a right of publicity existed,4 and that it
survived death.45 The Second Circuit, however, found that California law applied, 4' and under the law of that state, the Marx Broth36. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844.
37. Id. at 839.
38. Id.
39. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979).
40. Id. at 822, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal Rptr. at 328.
41. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at §9.
42. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'g 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
43. Id. at 318.
44. Groucho Marx Productions v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 489 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 492.
46. Grouch Marx, 689 F.2d at 320. The Second Circuit noted that the district court's
decision to look to New York law was incorrect. Id. at 319. Recognizing that the three Marx

brothers were California residents at the time of their deaths, and although the conduct
alleged to impair their rights occurred in New York, California was the state with the most
significant contacts. Id. at 319-20.
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ers' right of publicity ended at death.47 The court cited the Lugosi
decision for the proposition that California did not "recognize a
descendible right of publicity available to the heirs of a celebrity
who did not exploit his own right during his lifetime." 8 The
Groucho Marx court reasoned that the Lugosi decision had two
different interpretations: 1) California recognized no descendible
right of publicity; or 2) California law recognized a descendible law
of publicity, but this right protected only those products or services with which the decedent associated or promoted during his
lifetime.'9 Because defendants in Groucho Marx used the likeness
and comedic style of the Marx Brothers in an original play with
which the entertainers had not themselves associated while alive, 50
the right of publicity did not descend in this situation.5 1 Thus, the
Second Circuit seemed to adopt the defendants' argument in the
Hicks case 52 implying that only the direct efforts of the deceased
would be protected from unlawful commercial appropriation.
At the same time the New York courts were grappling with
the right of publicity issue, an unrelated line of decisions was rendered involving the estate of Elvis Presley. In Memphis Dev.
Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc.," the Sixth Circuit rejected a postmortem right of publicity." Plaintiff, Factors Etc., was the exclusive licensee of the Presley estate.55 Factors Etc. brought suit to
enjoin defendant from making and selling small pewter replicas of
a statue of Presley in return for a twenty-five dollar donation," the
proceeds of which were to be used to build a bronze statue of the
star in downtown Memphis.57 The district court granted the pre47.
48.
49.
50.

51.

Id. at 323.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 323.

Id.
Id. The court went on to hold:

Since California would recognize, at most, a descendible right of publicity only
in connection with particular commercial situations-products and ser-

vices--that a celebrity promoted during his lifetime, we conclude that California
would not recognize a descendible right of publicity that protects against an

original play using a celebrity's likeness and comedic style.
Id. (footnote omitted).
52. See supra text accompanying note 33.
53. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
54. Memphis Development, 616 F.2d at 957.

55. Id. Two days after the entertainer's death, Factors, Etc. purchased the license
from Boxcar Enterprises, as Presley had previously conveyed Boxcar the exclusive rights to
exploit the commercial value of his name. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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liminary injunction.58 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the
right of publicity was not inheritable, and stated that "[a]fter
death, the opportunity for gain shifts to the public domain, where
it is equally open to all.""s5
The Memphis Development court further asserted that the
public's right to the free commercial and competitive use of the
famous decedent's name and likeness outweighed any increased
creativity of the decedent that would be motivated by the knowledge that the heirs would benefit.6 0 The court explained:
Heretofore, the law has always thought that leaving a good name
to one's children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual,
whether famous or not. Commercialization of this virtue after
death in the hands of heirs is contrary to our legal tradition and
somehow seems contrary to the moral presuppositions of our
culture.. . . It seems fairer and more efficient for the commercial, aesthetic, and political use of the name, memory and image
of the famous to be open to all rather than to be monopolized by
a few. An equal distribution of the opportunity to use the name
of the dead seems preferable. The memory, name and pictures
of famous individuals should be regarded as a common asset to
be shared, an economic opportunity available in the free market
system. 1
Consequently, unjust enrichment from appropriation of another's
work would not be prohibited after the other person's death.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit identified several issues associated
with an inheritable right of publicity, questioning, for example, the
duration of the right.2 Would the right be taxed?6" Did the right
apply only to famous entertainers, public officials, military heroes,
65
etc? 64 How would conflict with the first amendment be resolved?
What would the right cover (e.g., pastry ("Napoleon"), a football
stadium ("RFK"), apartment complex names, posters, electric util58. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 24 (W.D. Tenn.
1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). The injunction
allowed the Memphis Foundation to build the memorial, but prohibited it from "manufacturing, selling or distributing any statuette bearing the image or likeness of Elvis Presley, or
utilizing commercially or in any manner or form the name, image, photograph or likeness of
Elvis Presley." Memphis Development, 616 F.2d at 957.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 959-60.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 959.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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ities ("Edison"), or insurance ("John Hancock"))? 66 The court concluded that fame was
"an attribute from which others may benefit
67
but may not own."

Another suit involving the Presley estate was litigated in New
York. In FactorsEtc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,6s plaintiff brought suit
to enjoin infringement of its exclusive license to Presley's name
and likeness.6 9 Defendants had published a poster of Presley entitled "In Memory," thereby making commercial use of the Presley
name. 70 The district court granted the preliminary injunction, and
the Second Circuit affirmed and remanded.7 1 On remand,7 2 the dis-

trict court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,73 basing its decision on "careful consideration of relevant cases and
competing policy concerns," thus not conforming with the views of
74
the Sixth Circuit.

Defendants again appealed to the Second Circuit, which this
time reversed the lower court. 75 The Second Circuit found that
Tennessee law was applicable; 76 the only question facing the court
was whether to defer to the opinion of the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Development.7 7 The Second Circuit concluded:

Where, as here, the pertinent court of appeals has essayed its
own prediction of the course of state law on a question of first
impression within that state, the federal courts of other circuits
should defer to that holding, perhaps always, and at least in all
situations except the rare instance when it can be said with conviction that the pertinent court of appeals has disregarded clear
signals emanating from the state's highest court pointing toward
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1095. Defendants had raised the defenses of federal preemption, contractual

right of first refusal, and the first amendment. The Second Circuit rejected all three arguments. Specifically, the court found that the right of publicity has not been addressed by
federal law, and was outside of the scope of copyright law. Id. at 1100. Second, the court
determined that the events surrounding this dispute forced a finding contrary to a valid
right of first refusal. Id. at 1103. Finally, the court acknowledged that the right of publicity
"may have to yield to the First Amendment under certain circumstances." Id. However, the
facts of this case did not present an occasion to assert a constitutional privilege. Id.
75. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 284 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 281.
77. Id. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Memphis
Development case.
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a different rule.78
Because there was a lack of evidence demonstrating that the Sixth
Circuit decided incorrectly, the Second Circuit deferred to the
opinion of the Sixth Circuit, and reversed the permanent
injunction.7 9
In a forceful dissent, Circuit Judge Mansfield disagreed with
the deference given the Sixth Circuit by the majority.8 0 He explained that the Sixth Circuit's opinion was "not in any way derived from the local law of Tennessee," and that it was inconsistent with "nearly every other case which had considered the
issue." 81 Moreover, it was "contrary to all current views of scholarly commentators on the subject." ' The dissenting judge refuted
the "parade of horrors conjured by the Sixth Circuit, . . .,"8
referring to the practical concerns associated with a recognized descendible right of publicity.
Judge Mansfield instructed that it was not sufficient for the
decedent to have been a public figure to recognize a descendible
publicity right;8 4 the law required some degree of commercial exploitation of decedent's fame.8 5 Further, the publicity right did not
apply to titles and offices not alienable by law. 6
The Factors case was next remanded to the district court for
entry of final judgment. Entry of judgment was stayed pending
plaintiffs' petition to the Second Circuit to reverse its order based
on a change in state law.8 7 Plaintiffs had cited a 1981 Tennessee
decision which held that Tennessee did recognize a descendible
right of publicity.8 The Second Circuit,8 9 however, pointed out
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Factors, 652 F.2d at 283.
Id.
Id. at 284 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 287.

84. Id.
85. Id. Judge Mansfield pointed out that he "would require proof of some form of
exploitation along the lines outlined.., in Hicks...." Id. at 287 n.4.
86. Id. at 287.
87. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. Factors, 541 F. Supp. at 233. The case relied upon by plaintiffs was Commerce
Union Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 7 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 2204 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.
1981). Because this case held that, under Tennessee law, the right of publicity was descendible, plaintiffs requested the Second Circuit to stay entry of judgment, so that they could
petition the Second Circuit to recall its mandate and rehear the case on the basis of the
intervening Commerce Union Bank case. Factors, 541 F. Supp. at 233.
89. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
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that a subsequent Tennessee decision 0 held that Tennessee did
not recognize a descendible right of publicity,91 and concluded that
conflicting decisions of the state court afforded it "no basis for considering the law of Tennessee to have authoritatively been
changed ... ."92

Judge Mansfield again dissented, noting:
The conflicting Tennessee Chancery Court decisions only serve
to emphasize that, with due respect for our distinguished and
able colleagues of the Sixth Circuit, we are in as good a position
as they to divine what would be the position of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee on the issue-of whether the right of publicity
is descendible.9

Judge Mansfield recommended the court follow its usual practice
when faced with a circuit conflict, namely, to "decid[e] a ' 'case
ac94
cording to what we believe to be the more rational basis.
Cases concerning the issue of a descendible right of publicity
arose in other parts of the country. In Martin Luther King, Jr.
Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,9 5 the
Eleventh Circuit was faced with a case involving the publicity
rights of Martin Luther King, Jr.96 Defendants had manufactured
and sold plastic busts of King. Plaintiffs refused to endorse the
promotion, and sought, to enjoin defendants from reproducing the
image of King for commercial purposes, basing their request on the
right of publicity.9 7 The district court for Georgia granted in part
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction," and plaintiffs appealed. 99 The Eleventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of
Georgia the questions of whether the right of publicity was recognized in Georgia as a right distinct from the right of privacy, and if
90. Lancaster v. Factors Etc., Inc., 9 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1109 (Tenn Ch. Ct. 1982).
91. Factors, 701 F.2d at 12.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 13 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 675.
97. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., 508 F. Supp. 854, 862 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
98. Id. at 854. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for an injunction as to the
use of the name of Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change in the marketing of
the busts, and as to the use of his name for commercial profit The court did not enjoin
defendants, however, from the sale and manufacture of the plastic busts of the image of
King. Id. at 866.
99. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
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so, whether the right survived the death of its owner. 10 0 In reply,
the Georgia Supreme Court instructed that Georgia recognized a
descendible right of publicity, having a measure of damages equal
to "the value of the appropriation to the user."1 01 The Georgia
court relied on the principle that the unlawful appropriation of another's property "for the financial gain of the appropriator is a
tort.... -101 Moreover, the Georgia court declared that it did not
subscribe to the lifetime exploitation requirement.1 0 3 Accordingly,
04
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment.
Later in 1983, the Eleventh Circuit in Acme Circus Operating
Co. v. Kuperstock'0 applied California law to find that the publicity rights in the name "Clyde Beatty" were descendible. 06 Beatty,
an animal trainer and operator of the Clyde Beatty Circus, as10 7
signed all of the rights in his name to his wife before his death.
Plaintiff Acme Circus initially sought a declaratory judgment to
recognize its right to use the Beatty name with its circus.1 08 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that it faced "no small task" in trying to
apply California law,1 09 as it had to clarify the confusing Lugosi
decision. 1 0 The court interpreted Lugosi to require lifetime exploitation, thereby turning the right of publicity into a commercial
venture. " The Kuperstock court found that where the right was
so exploited, as well as assigned during the owner's lifetime, the
rights from the assignment survived the owner's death. " 2 Because
Beatty satisfied both requirements, his wife held valid publicity
rights in his name." 3 Thus, the court reinforced the underlying notion of publicity rights, namely, that a third party cannot appropriate the labor and accomplishments of another for his own com100. Id. at 674.
101. Id. at 680.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 682.
104. Id. at 675.
105. 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. at 1545.
107. Id. at 1539.
108. Id. at 1539-40. In 1958, Beatty had sold his circus equipment and property to
Acme Circus, licensing to the circus the right to use the name of Clyde Beatty and Clyde

Beatty Circus. Id. at 1539. The agreement was for a term of ten years. Id. In 1965, Beatty
assigned all of his "right, title and interest in the Clyde Beatty Circus title and equipment"
to his wife, Jane Beatty Kuperstock. Id.
109. Id. at 1541.
110. Id. at 1541-45. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Lugosi opinion.
111. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d at 1544.

112. Id.
113. Id. at 1545.
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mercial gain.
A more recent decision absolutely rejecting a post-mortem
right of publicity is Reeves v. United Artists.1 14 Plaintiff, the
widow of boxer J.R. Jimmy Reeves, brought suit alleging misappropriation of her deceased husband's "name, identity, character,
ability and performance,"1' 15 resulting from defendant's release of a
motion picture depicting a portion of one of Reeves' fights."' The
district court, looking to the Ohio Supreme Court decision in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 111 noted that the
state supreme court expressly rejected the right of publicity as a
property right and found it to be in harmony with the right of privacy.11 For this reason, the district-court concluded "that under
Ohio law, the right of publicity, like the right of privacy, [was] not
descendible." 9
In 1984, the New York courts encountered a different type of
appropriation. Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence'20 concerned a
theater in Manhattan that had been renamed for Tennessee Williams. 21 Defendants claimed that their actions were meant to
honor the deceased playwright; however, the court found that defendants were motivated by financial gain. 2" The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction, commented:
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the
theft of good will. No secial purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would normally pay.13
More recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that
Tennessee recognized a descendible common law right of publicity.12 4 In State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v.
114. 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
115. Id. at 1231.
116. Id. at 1232.
117. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S.
562 (1977).
118. Reeves, 572 F. Supp. at 1235.
119. Id.
120. 104 A.D.2d 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 219-20, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
123. Id. at 218, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)).
124. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Crowell,'2" plaintiff, a corporation not licensed to use the Presley
name, alleged unfair competition by defendant corporation which
was licensed by the Presley estate. 2 ' The Tennessee court affirmed
the trial court's finding that Presley's right to control the commercial exploitation of his publicity had descended to his estate,'"" rejecting the Sixth Circuit's holding in Memphis Development.128
The court explained that the Sixth Circuit's decision was "based
upon an incorrect construction of Tennessee law and [was] incon29
sistent with the better reasoned decisions in this field."1
The Tennessee court also discussed the pecuniary value of the
right of publicity, observing the widespread practice of celebrities'
exploitation of their public recognition. 3 0 The court acknowledged
its acute sensitivity to this because of its situs-Nashville: "There
are few every day activities that have not been touched by celebrity merchandising.. . . These endorsements are of great economic
value to celebrities and are now economic reality."' 3'
Based on this Tennessee decision, the Sixth Circuit chose not
to follow its Memphis Development ruling in yet another Presley
case. In Elvis Presley Enter. v. Elvisly Yours,' 32 plaintiff, an assignee of various rights of the Presley estate, brought suit to enjoin
defendant from selling products containing the logo "Elvisly
Yours."'3 3 The Sixth Circuit noted that the district court had not
addressed the issue of a descendible right of publicity except to
recognize defendants' reliance on Memphis Development. 34 Acknowledging that its Memphis Development decision was based on
policy and equity and not on Tennessee cases, 3 5 the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of the state court decision recognizing a descendible right to publicity.3 6
In Gracey v. Maddin,'3" a Tennessee appellate court relied, in
125. 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Memphis
Development case.
129. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 97.
130. Id. at 94.
131. Id.
132. 14 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1053 (6th Cir. 1987).
133. Id. at 1053.
134. Id. at 1055.

135. Id.
136.
137.

Id.
769 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. App. 1989).
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part, on the Crowell opinion. Gracey arose when plaintiff, a deceased attorney's widow, brought suit to prohibit defendants' use
of the decedent's name as part of the name of a law firm in which
decedent had been a practicing partner. 18 The trial court granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, entering judgment
prohibiting defendants' use of decedent's name.1 39 The appellate
court affirmed, and in noting the fundamental nature of individual
property rights, declared that "[u]nquestionably, a celebrity's right
of publicity has value."' 0 Finding a sufficient basis to classify the
right of publicity as an intangible property right,"" the court concluded that a person has an assignable property right in the use of
his name. " 2 In Gracey, the court found that the partnership did
not have the right, absent a voluntary agreement between the decedent or his estate and the partnership, to the continued use of
43
decedent's name.
In sum, the right of publicity "recognizes one of the basic
principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence that 'one may not reap
where another has sown nor gather where another has strewn.' "144
With the exception of the Reeves decision,14 5 the case law today
indicates that the judicial system appreciates the pecuniary value
of the right of publicity, associating it with the legal doctrine of
unjust enrichment to provide post-mortem protection. The right is
increasingly being aligned with property rights rather than personal rights.
IV.

LEGISLATION

The modern trend evidences the recognition by individual
states of the right of publicity either at common law or by statute.
To date, nearly one-half of the states have done so." 6 Courts in
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michi138. Id. at 498.
139. Id. at 497.
140. Id. at 500.
141. The court noted that the right of publicity "can be possessed and used, it can be
assigned, and it can be the subject of a contract. Thus, there is ample basis for this Court to
conclude that it is a species of intangible personal property." Id. at 500-01.
142. Id. at 501.
143. Id. at 500. The court recognized that "an individual's name may become so associated with a partnership as to strip it of its individuality, thereby transforming it into part
of the partnership good will." Id. No such transformation occurred in Gracey. Id.
144. Dewey, supra note 4, at 61.
145. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
146. McCAR IHY, supra note 19, at § 6.1. See also, Note, The Right of Publicity Run
Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1179, 1179-80 (1987).
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gan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
1 47
and Wisconsin have recognized a common law right of publicity.
Of those states, California, Florida, and Texas also have statutes
expressly recognizing a post-mortem right of publicity.4 4 In addition, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah
expressly recognize a right of publicity.14 Five states have impliedly recognized a right of publicity within their privacy statutes:
Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin.'50
While the statutes vary in some particulars, a common thread
exists throughout-the prohibition of unlawful appropriation of
another's property for commercial purposes. The language of the
Florida statute is representative: "No person shall publish, print,
display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any
commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph,
or other likeness of any natural person without [] express written
or oral consent. . . .15 The Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas statutes go further in stating that an individual's interest in their
name or likeness is a property right: "The general assembly recognizes that a person has property rights in his name. and likeness
52
which are entitled to protection from commercial exploitation."1
Although the general principle is the same throughout these
legislative enactments, potentially troublesome differences exist.
Of those states acknowledging some statutory right of publicity,
nine provide for post-mortem rights: California, Florida, Kentucky,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.15
Of these nine, seven furnish a definite duration,'" and only Cali147. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.1[B]. But see supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text concerning the Reeves decision and Ohio state law.
148. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 9.5[A]. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1988); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon Supp.
1991).
149. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 9.5[A]. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Baldwin 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1448 (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1
to -6 (1988).
150. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.3[A]. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-201-211
(1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28-28.1
(1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1) (West 1988).
152. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(1) (Baldwin 1989). The Tennessee and Texas statutes include an individual's photograph. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1988); TEx.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
153. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.3[A].
154. Id. Those states are California, Florida, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia. Id. Nebraska provides no definite term. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-208 (1987).
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fornia, Kentucky, and Texas maintain a duration of fifty years.1 "
Oklahoma provides the most extensive protection of 100 years.' "
California, Oklahoma, and Texas require that a person claiming to
be the successor-in-interest to the rights of a deceased personality
must register that claim with the Secretary of State before any
15 7
damages may be recovered.
The extent of the statutory protection varies among jurisdictions. While all of the statutes cover an individual's name and likeness,1 58 only California, Oklahoma, and Texas protect the voice.'5
California, Florida, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas protect a
photograph. 60 Additionally, statutory remedies differ.1 61 Massachusetts and Rhode Island, for example, provide for treble damages.162 California and Texas are the only states that do not maintain injunctive relief. 6 3 Kentucky and Nebraska provide no
definitive statutory relief. 6 4 Finally, only California and Tennessee
expressly address the lifetime exploitation requirement by re16 5
jecting it.
While the notion of unlawful appropriation is seen consistently, interstate variation in the framework of the right of publicity is obvious. Concomitant with this are problems of notice, choice
McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.3 [A]. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (West Supp.
STAT. ANN. § 391.170(2) (Baldwin 1989); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1991). Florida provides forty years of protection. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(4)
(West 1988). Tennessee provides ten years of protection whether or not the right is exercised. If the publicity right is commercially exploited, the protection will be maintained as
long as the exploitation is maintained. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104(a)-(b)(1) (1988).
Virginia provides twenty years of protection. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40(B) (1984).
156. OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(G) (West Supp. 1991).
157. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(f)(1) (West Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1448 (F)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1991); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.006 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
158. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.3[A]. "Likeness" is defined as including a picture. Id.
159. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 990(a) (West Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1448(A) (West Supp. 1991); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
160. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 990(a) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1)
(West 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(A) (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4725-1103(a) (1988); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
161. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.3[A].
162. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28
(1985).
163. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(a) (West Supp. 1991); Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013
(Vernon Supp. 1991).
164. See Ky. RE. STAT. §§ 391.170 (Baldwin 1989); Nas. REv. STAT. §§ 20-208--209
(1987).
165. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(h) (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-251103(b) (1988).
155.

1991); Ky. REv.
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of law, and forum shopping.1 66 An example is Southeast Bank,
N.A. v. Lawrence,' 67 where both the trial court and the appellate
court applied New York law and ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
granting a preliminary injunction. However, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed, finding that Florida law applied. The court
explained that governing choice of law principles required application of "the substantive law of the decedent's domicile."' Because
decedent was a Florida domiciliary when he died, under Florida
law, plaintiff did not have a cause of action. 69
Similar situations occur among the federal and state systems.
For example, the Tennessee appellate court in State ex rel. Elvis
Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell 7 0° declared that the
Sixth Circuit, in its Memphis Development decision, incorrectly
construed Tennessee law."' Thus, a party's subsequent reliance on
Memphis Development would be misplaced. Likewise, the formidable history of FactorsEtc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. provides a good
example of the difficulties encountered by the federal courts in applying state law.1 73 Given the interstate nature of most products,
potential parties face confusion as to what is necessary to protect
themselves. Can the licensee of the Presley estate prohibit the
commercial appropriation of Elvis' likeness in Kentucky, but not
in neighboring Ohio? The Presley licensee can prevent third party
appropriation for as long as the licensee commercially exploits the
property right in Tennessee, for fifty years in bordering Kentucky,
and for only twenty years in neighboring Virginia.17' This "legal
wilderness" is further complicated in those states that have not yet
addressed the right of publicity and its descendibility. For example, what protection could the Presley licensee, who commercially
exploits the publicity right in Tennessee, expect from the courts in
the adjoining state of Alabama? These uncertainties equate to disincentives: "The current patchwork of state regulation adversely
affects creation incentives ...
"
Entertainment producers face
higher costs in protecting their publicity assets in multiple law166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Note, supra note 146, at 1180.
66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S. 2d 775 (N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 912, 489 N.E.2d at 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
Id.
733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn Ct. App. 1987).
See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 129.
See supra notes 68-94 and accompanying text.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
Note, supra note 146, at 1185.
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suits.' 76 Additionally, producers can expect lowered financial returns as a result of inadequate legal protection.1 77 Our society values productivity and creativity17 8 as well as individual property
rights. 79 While efforts by individual states to provide protection
are highly commendable, more complete protection is needed
which will foster incentive, ultimately benefitting the public.
V.

SOLUTIONS

Proposed solutions to the current variation in protection of
publicity rights include an absolute rule against descendibility,
analogies to trademark or copyright rather than to privacy or property, and a federal statute recognizing a descendible right of publicity. A lengthy analysis published in 1985 argued against the
descendibility of the right of publicity.1 80 The authors acknowledged that their position was "unusual."1 81
The case against an inheritable publicity right is based on
strict legal analysis. The right of publicity has its roots in the right
of privacy, or liberty. It has no property interests flowing from it
because it fails to satisfy both descriptive and theoretical aspects
of property. Therefore, inheritability is inconsistent with the right
of publicity. 82 The discussion of descriptive property factors centered on specificity, or "thingness." The commentators assert that
the right of publicity is "a general claim against the world involving some general personal characteristic or ability.. . . [S]uch nonspecific, free-floating claims are precisely the 'rights' which comprise liberty."1 88
The theoretical discussion springs from the specificity requirement, and employs economic theory. Because it lacks specificity,
the right of publicity is incommensurable and thus inalienable.
The authors conceded that, in today's market, publicity rights are
a valuable commodity. The authors differentiate between inter
vivos and post-mortem rights, resolving that rights ending at death
would carry a correspondingly smaller risk of mismeasure of in176.

Id. at 1186. A prime example of this concern is evidenced by the multitudinous

suits brought and defended by the Presley estate.
177. Note, supra note 146, at 1185-86.
178. Id. at 1186 n.45 (citing the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976)).
179. See, e.g., Gracey v. Maddin, 769 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. App. 1989).
180. Terrell & Smith, supra note 5, at 2.

181. Id.
182.
183.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 32.
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commensurable values.184 In sum, the authors' view the right of
publicity as an aspect of liberty allowing a person to waive his or
her right of privacy,1 8 concluding that the right of publicity must
186
undergo significant transformations to support inheritability.
Another solution to the problem involves an analogy to trademark law, as opposed to privacy or property law analogies. 187 Certain provisions of the federal trademark law could provide a cause
of action for advancing publicity rights.18 8 Trademark statutes,
however, may not provide the answer to protection of publicity
rights.1 89 In general, claims under federal trademark law must meet
three elements for success: 1) involvement of goods or services; 2)
in interstate commerce; and 3) misrepresentation concerning some
component of the goods or services.1 90 The focus is on consumer
and competitor protection from misrepresentation of interstate
goods or services. A potential infringer of publicity rights could
elude liability by including a disclaimer within the infringing
activity. 91
Others suggest that the proper theoretical basis for the right
of publicity is an analogy to copyright.1 92 Copyright and the right
of publicity share a similar purpose-"to provide an incentive for
enterprise and creativity by allowing individuals to benefit from
their personal efforts"'e-which one author has called "one pea in
two pods.'

94

Certain limits are put on copyright to prevent con-

flicts with the first amendment; similar limitations could be applied to publicity rights. Some authors assert that the right should
be limited to commercial products where free speech interests are
lessened. 9 5 Publicity rights could be manifested in a contract
before they would be held devisable,9 6 thereby ensuring the fulfillment of the social policy of encouraging enterprise. 97 This analogy
affords a solution to the problem of perpetual publicity rights be184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 6-7, 50-53.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 64.
McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.16[AI.

Id.

Id. The noted trademark provisions are 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a),(c), 1125 (1982).
See Lanham Act § 43(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1982)).
Note, supra note 146, at 1196-97.
See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1129-32.
Id. at 1129.
194. R.F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SocIETY: HUMAN RloIrrs IN CoNmrcTr 134, 153
(1987).
195. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1130.
196. Id. at 1131.
197. Id. at 1130-31.
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cause federal copyright law provides for a limited duration of postmortem rights."9 '
This proposed analogy has also been criticized. 19 Copyright
protects expression "fixed in any tangible medium. ' 200 To extend
this copyright protection to publicity rights requires an acceptance
of some form of the lifetime exploitation doctrine. As noted, most
courts and all state legislatures which have acted have expressly or
impliedly rejected this notion.20 1
The remaining proposed solution offers the most promise-a
federal statute that is consistent in duration, remedies, requirements, and extent of protection. At least one author, however,
warned that "such a proposal seems at present to stand outside the
realm of probability."2' 02 Discussion of a specific federal law must
begin with the congressional authority to enact such a statute. The
Constitution provides Congress with the authority to legislate in
the area of copyright;208 furthermore, the commerce clause could
also be a source of power. 0 4
A federal statute would need to eliminate the disincentive attributed to the current variations in state law.2 05 The exclusive
right to control all commercial aspects of publicity would define
the extent of protection, thus enhancing incentive while providing
latitude for free speech. 06 The statute should also include a fixed
duration. 0 7 One author suggested a fifty year limitation that would
parallel the copyright statute. 08 Additionally, the statute should
acknowledge the right as survivable and transferrable, as have the
majority of judicial and legislative bodies addressing the issue.2 09
Moreover, a federal statute should include provisions for dam198. Id. at 1131-32.
199. See Note, supra note 146, at 1187; HixSON, supra note 194, at 153.
200. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
201. Copyright law has been held to preempt state law publicity rights. In 1986, the
Seventh Circuit held that telecasts of baseball players which were videotaped and aired
simultaneously were fixed in tangible form. As a result, the telecasts were proper subject
matter for copyright. Thus, federal law preempted state law. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
941 (1987). Under this analysis, state publicity claims would always be subordinate to federal copyright claims. A return to the premise that copyright and publicity rights protect
different property interests would remedy this situation. Note, supra note 146, at 1187-89.
202. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 6.16[A].
203. See U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
204. See U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
205. Note, supra note 146, at 1193.
206. Id. at 1194.
207. Id. at 1204. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
208. Note, supra note 143, at 1204.

209. Id.

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss2/5

20

Neumeyer: The Right of Publicity and its Descendibility
1990]

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

ages; declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and punitive
damages have been suggested.2 1 The statute should cover all individuals, not restrict its protection to only entertainers and athletes.
Finally, an express preemption provision, stating that all publicity
right actions grounded in state and common law would be expressly preempted, has been suggested. 211 One author described
the current need by stating: "[When] we've got 'grave robbers from
Memphis, Tennessee,' Congress must come forth to eliminate un'212
authorized evils.
The right of publicity is a confusing area of law. Even a cursory look at the case law evidences the cloudy nature and state of
the right. The only point agreed upon is that the right of publicity
has its genesis in the right of privacy.2 13 This apparent consistency
has led to much of the difficulty encountered today. The right of
publicity is founded in privacy law, yet the right of publicity focuses on pecuniary interests, not personal interests. Because of the
confusion between the right of privacy and the right of publicity,
the law in this area has been characterized as a "haystack in a hurricane."" " The theoretical discussion
is also mired in, as Justice
'2 15
Cardozo said, a "tyranny of labels:
The strength of an analogical approach is that once the equivalence is established, previously developed rationales and conclusions can be brought to bear on the new situation. . . . But a
major difficulty with analogies, derived from precisely the same
source as their strength, is that they tend to impose a mature,
elaborated ssystem on what may well be an unformulated
21
situation.
A legal framework is necessary to formulate a cause of action,
and to provide certainty to the public as well as notice to potential
parties. One commentator suggested that operating without this
underlying legal support is like "throwing a bunch of mud at the
210. Id. at 1205-06.
211. Id. at 1206-07.
212. Id. at 1207 (quoting Elvis Costello, Worthless Thing. Copyright, 1984, Plangent
Visions Music, Inc.).
213. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
214. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 93
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481,
485 (3d Cir. 1956)).
215. McCATHY, supra note 19, at § 5 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
114 (1934)).
216. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1127. See also S. HALPmN, THE LAw oF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PuBLIcrrY AND "MoRAL RIGHTS" 614 (1988).
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[opponent] and seeing what sticks.

'2 17

While some consistencies
are seen in the relevant case law, most of the decisions are couched
in indefinite terminology. The dedicated reader who labors through
various opinions is left with a feeling of uncertainty. Exactly what
would a well-pleaded complaint look like? What elements of law
need to be established? The defendant's lot seems much simpler-merely claim that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action.
A plaintiff's attorney must also keep in mind the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 8 provides that a pleading "shall
contain. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief. . ..,2"Additionally, Rule 11 mandates sanctions against an attorney unless, "to the best of the [attorney's] knowledge . . . [the pleading] is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.. .,. A party
asserting a right of publicity is better served by an organized legal
structure rather than a "mud slinging," case-by-case, state-by-state
approach.
One commentator wrote that "[tlhe person trained in the law
is taught from the beginning to think of the law as a series of discrete legal 'theories' or subsets of rules. '220 However, the right of
publicity simply does not conform to any established legal precept.
Property principles, specifically intellectual property, most closely
approximate the factors that compose the right of publicity, but
the commonly accepted roots in privacy law are difficult, if not impossible, to divorce when trying to classify publicity rights. The
right of publicity requires its own statement of legal theory, and
the obligatory consideration of privacy should be discarded.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In modern western society, the right of publicity is a valuable
commodity. This form of intellectual property should be recognized as descendible, and its value determined by economic factors. 2 Increasing numbers of judicial systems and legislatures recognize the pecuniary value which individuals create in their
personality. Additionally, the fundamental tenet of unjust enrichment is incompatible with the idea of the property of another fall217. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 5-4.
218.
219.
220.
221.

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(2).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
McCARTHY, aupra note 19, at § 5-4.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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ing into the public domain for commercial appropriation. A comparison may be drawn to the individual who invests his energy in
the stock market and the individual who invests his labor in his
name. The assets developed in the stock market are unquestionably devisable. Yet, the assets developed in the marketing of a personality may not be. Because these assets are not devisable, the
property interests of the heirs to this property are eliminated. One
commentator characterized this result as "rather harsh" treatment
for an individual investing efforts in the development' 22
of his name,
and "a rather heavy burden to impose on creativity. 2
An individual is entitled to protection of his property and creativity. The unjust enrichment of third persons, who unfairly appropriate the property of another for commercial purposes, is ruinous to society. The right needs to be balanced with the other
fundamental rights of our society, particularly the freedom of
speech. Federal legislative action is needed to stop the "grave robbers, ''122 3 while remaining mindful of the social importance of
preventing the monopolization of the memories of those who, because of their celebrity status, became part of our public identity.

222.
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Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1132.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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